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adversely affects firm value. Firms invest resources and pay a premium to politically 
connected persons (BOD or other personnel). Such connections serve the twin 
purposes of hedging and enhancement of the value of collateral pledged against bank 
loans. Feeling secured, banks lose incentives to monitor borrowing firms. Thus, wealth 
effect of bailout from political connection is partially offset by the losses of valuable 
information brought about by bank lending. In equilibrium, the trade-off from gains 
out of political connections and costs due to losses from information-based bank 
monitoring depend on (i) the country’s disclosure laws, (ii) the political environment, 
(iii) the premium paid to form connections, and (iv) the state of the economy. 
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1 Introduction 
A large volume of empirical literature has revealed the pervasive use of political con-
nections by firms across many countries as a means of obtaining favours and economic 
gains from the state. See, Amore and Bennedsen 2013; Din ¸c 2005; Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell 2006; Faccio 2006; Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Li, Meng, Wang 
and Zhou 2008 among others, for extensive discussion of this phenomenon in diverse 
economic and financial environments. Earlier studies in this area focused on corruption 
and rent seeking activities of such connected firms in generic cases (See Krueger 1974 and 
Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Recent studies further underscore the importance of financial 
markets in facilitating such connections between the concerned parties - namely, firms, 
banks, and politicians. These studies reveal that firms utilize resources to nurture political 
connections which enable them to secure loans on concessionary terms, default without 
many penalties and even extract a bailout in the event of financial distress. A large number 
of these papers show the existence of direct links between politicians and key personnel 
such as CEOs and members of the board of many firms1. Also, firms often contribute funds 
to political parties contesting elections. In return they receive multiple direct and indirect 
favours from banks and financial institutions in many countries. See Black, Jang and Kim 
2006; Charumilind, Kali and Wiwattanakantang 2006; Fan, Wong and Zhang 2007; Infante 
and Piazza 2014; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Li et al. 2008; 
Piotroski and Zhang 2014; and Xu, Yuan, Jiang and Chan 2015; for country-specific studies 
on multiple dimensions relating political connections of firms to banks and financial 
markets2. 
The literature has certainly enriched our understanding of the subject by presenting 
substantial body of evidence of political links and their modus operandi. However, it is 
1See Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Claessens, Feijen and Laeven 2008; and Goldman, Rocholl and So 2009; for 
campaign financing and composition of directors and other key personnel within firms.  
2These papers consider the various forms of political connections in financial markets and banking institutions 
in a large number of countries in Asia, Europe and Americas.  
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also a fact that not all firms are politically connected as such connections - although they 
bring benefits also impose direct and indirect costs on firms. For example, the opportunity 
cost of hiring a politically connected CEO or personnel, or nominating such members to the 
board, is the forgone contributions of others who could have added value to the firm with 
their skills and expertise. The technical and politically connected board members are at best 
imperfect substitutes. Hence, a pertinent but so far unanswered question that occurs in this 
context is: what are the determinants of the trade-off behind the formation of such 
connections? That is, what are the incremental gains and costs faced by a firm that plans to 
forge political connections? Important related questions are: if political ties end up 
intervening in financial markets and institutions (as suggested by a large number of studies), 
how do they affect their core activities such as monitoring, supervision and production of 
information? Finally, are there any spill-over effects of such intervention in financial systems 
that impact the value of the borrowing firms? 
While addressing these questions, the paper contributes to the literature by offering new 
insights on the impact of political intervention on banks and financial markets and also by 
providing new empirical implications for the economies where the financial market is often 
subject to political influences. First, we establish that politically motivated state intervention 
for bailing out the connected firms in times of financial distress impair the banks’ and 
financial institutions’ abilities to produce information used extensively in the process of 
selection and monitoring of borrowing firms’ projects. The resulting reduction of substantive 
content of banks’ information used for loan evaluation imposes costs on the overall economy 
because it gives rise to a larger number of project failures, inefficient bankruptcies and fewer 
restructuring. Such phenomena are likely to occur because banks invest time, resources and 
money in acquiring information used in the process of granting loans to borrowers, monitoring 
of their projects and pricing of loan. The production of information generated in this process 
contributes to firm value and make bank loans 
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special to alternative means of financing. See classic studies by James 1987, Lummer and 
McConnell 1989 on the special role of banks which are followed by a host of studies like 
Best and Zhang 1993, Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel 1995, and Ross 2010 among others. 
However, bailing out makes the loan partially secured and political “capital” of firm serves 
as intangible collateral for bank loans. Feeling safer, banks lose incentives to gather 
information about the likelihood of the bad state. Hence, the trade-off appears in 
equilibrium where firms’ benefits from bail out is partially offset by the lower level of 
information produced by banks. 
Thus political connection, though helps the firms by offering a hedge against the likelihood 
of poor cash flow, the trade-off imposes two types of costs in equilibrium: 
1. Direct costs, consisting of the payment of fees, remuneration and benefits to politically 
connected individuals who solicit for a bailout from the Government. 
2. Indirect or hidden costs that are incurred when banks, being beneficiaries from the 
borrowing firm’s political connections, lose incentives to produce information valuable for the 
firm as well. The potential value-reduction from less effective bank monitoring may represent 
an underexplored impact (i.e., a “hidden cost”) of government involvement in the financial 
markets and may contribute to the broader debate of the costs and benefits of state participation 
in economic activities. 
Second, we show that this detrimental effect on bank’s bid to acquisition of information 
varies negatively with (a) environments encouraging a greater political interference in financial 
systems (b) degree of transparencies and norms of disclosure requirements and (c) state of the 
economy. 
To put it in perspective, the result (a) is directly related to economies where a greater 
percentage of banks is owned by the state. Since the goal of building political connections is to 
ensure access to emergency financing (i.e., bailouts), a state owned bank (SOB) can be more 
easily persuaded to make politically motivated loans than would a private bank. Thus, our model 
predicts that political connections should be more valuable in a country 
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with a greater concentration of state ownership of banks. As a result, such economies will 
experience a decline in the banking services. There already exists a voluminous literature 
which show that SOBs are often used as a “tool of redistributive politics” ( See Megginson 
2005) whereby the state intervenes either directly or indirectly in pricing, disbursement 
and bailing out of loans on the basis of political patronage. A series of related empirical 
studies also document that state owned banks tend to be relatively more unprofitable and 
inefficient and often gets privatized as those political gains tend to be outweighed by costs 
which often consist of (among other elements) volume of bad loans disbursed parties with 
political connections. See Barth, Caprio and Levine 2004, Boehmer, Nash and Netter 2005 
, Megginson and Netter 2001 and Sapienza 2004 among many others for widespread 
evidence of adverse impact from both political and regulatory state intervention in SOB 
which are also consistent with conclusions reached in the current paper. 
Second, the degree of transparencies and norms of disclosure often determine costs of 
gathering valuable information about the firm and its projects and opaqueness in laws 
hampers bank’s efforts to collect such information. These factors  introduce greater 
uncertainty about the downside risk of a firm’s cash flow and encourage firms to build up 
political connections to shield downside risks. Our result in (b) is thus consistent with 
empirical findings of the related literature that show political connections vary in legal 
regimes depending on the strength of disclosures and transparencies. See Boehmer et al. 
2005 and La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer 2002 . 
We also show that the political connections of firms and accompanying reduction of 
information based lending get exacerbated by the standard agency problems in firms where 
ownership is separated from control. Finally, we offer a new testable implication that a bad state 
of the economy increases downside risk and encourages more political 
3By using a comprehensive dataset with 101 countries spanning 1982 to 2000, Boehmer et al. 2005 show that 
political influences, legal regimes and falling efficiencies of banks are important determinants of bank 
privatizations and thus in a way provide an indirect testimony to our conclusions regarding bank’s reduced ability 
to produce information due to political interference.  
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activities that further deteriorates quality of bank’s information.  
We derive these conclusions in a set up where (i) firms use political connections as 
tools of insurance-cum-hedging which cushion the adverse shocks to their cash flows and 
(ii) such connection also acts as an intangible collateral for the bank and makes its loan 
more secured. The firms pay premiums (remunerations) to the connected board members 
and personnel who, in turn, secure bailouts and other favors from political network. The 
opportunity cost of this premium is the forgone services by skilled directors/personnel and 
the marginal gain is the incremental probability of receiving emergency funds from the 
Government. 
Thus political connection in our model plays a role similar to hedging/insurance cum 
diversification strategies routinely followed by firms to mitigate exposures to business risk 
and uncertainty. See Markowitz 1952, Markowitz 1959, Buhlmann (1970), Cummins 1990, 
Cummins and Sommer 1996. The price (wage rate or other forms of remuneration) paid to the 
connected members acts like an insurance premium which is equivalent to buying “political 
patronage” which enables firms to reduce downside risk of business cash flows. A firm thus 
holds a diversified portfolio of technical and political members and personnel and the latter 
group builds political connection with the purpose of obtaining emergency funds in times of 
financial distress. Viewed from this perspective, the function of political network replicates 
diversification, hedging and related risk management strategies and this alternative route for 
managing risk is more likely to be observed in a greater frequency in economies with 
undeveloped financial markets. The degree and strength of political connectivity depend on 
the composition of the member of these two types (technical and political members) which in 
turn depends on the relative costs and benefits like the wage premium, probability of downside 
risk and magnitude of bailout. 
Such insurance/hedging motive behind the formation of political connection also makes this 
activity similar to investment where firm devotes resources in the current period for entering 
into a (semi) durable political network for reaping benefits in the future in times 
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of distress. That is, a firm hires and pays politically connected member/personnel before the 
resolution of uncertainty and its expected benefits arise in the future in the form of favorable 
financing or bailouts if the firm encounters financial hardship. This contingent benefit in the 
future in the form of an insurance is the fruit of past investment made for building political 
connections. 
This investment like feature embedded in insurance/hedging framework makes our model 
different from other papers in the literature. The corporate political activities may take many 
other forms like campaign financing, lobbying via a third party etc. For discussion of these 
other forms of political activity and their impact on the firm’s rates of return in political 
market, durability of such connections and other related issues, see Ansolabehere, De 
Figueiredo and Snyder 2003, Milyo, Primo and Groseclose 2000, Richter, Samphantharak and 
Timmons 2009 and Stratmann 2005. Moreover, Hersch, Netter and Pope 2008 present 
evidence that campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures do not lead to long-lasting 
benefits. They show that value of a firm’s intangible capital represented by Tobin’s q (market 
to book ratio) bear insignificant relationship to campaign contributions and lobbying 
expenditure which directly suggests that political connections formed via these routes are 
temporary and expenditures incurred in this process are often competed away and mostly they 
represent expenses but not investment. In the light of these findings, our paper can be 
generalized by splitting the decision to buy political influence for short- and long-run. The 
allocation of corporate fund for campaign /lobbying determines short-term objectives and the 
funds earmarked for appointment of a connected BOD (duration more than a year) can be 
considered as a forward looking investment4. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 below presents a benchmark model without 
political connections that discusses the core banking functions of information production, 
supervision, and firm value. Section 3 introduces political connections to grasp their incremental 
effects and section 4 pinpoints the equilibrium effects of political connections 
4We are indebted to a referee for pointing out this short-run versus long-run view of political connection. 
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and advances propositions and empirical hypotheses. Section 5 concludes the paper 
2 The Benchmark Model: No Political Connections 
In our benchmark case, we have a bank/intermediary (lender) that collects information and 
advances loans to a firm (borrower), partially secured by collateral. The firm does not have 
a political connection in any form with which to bail itself out of financial distress. The firm 
seeks a bank loan to invest in a risky project which requires an investment (I). The main 
objective in this section is to examine the bank’s incentives to gather information about the 
quality of the firm’s project and its impact on firm value. The analysis of this benchmark 
case allows us to compare the outcome to an environment where the bank’s incentives to 
gather information about the firm’s project affects the latter’s bid to form political 
connections and vice versa (see section 3). 
There are three relevant time periods for the model {T0, T1 and T2}. The project begins 
at (T0). The decisions to shut down or to continue the project taken at (T1) is based on the 
information collected by the bank at that time. At (T2), uncertainty is resolved and the 
project, if continued from the earlier phase, either succeeds or fails and the pay-off is 
distributed between owners of the firm and the bank. The quality of the project is uncertain 
at (T0) when it requires funding. At that time, it is known that there are good and bad 
projects. A good project arrives with probability (e)5. A good project always generates cash 
flow (y) with probability (Pr = 1) at (T2). A bad or poorer quality project generates the same 
cash flow at that time but with a lower probability of success, given by (0 ≤ sb < 1). The 
probability of arrival of the inferior quality project is (1 − e). 
An inferior quality project thus fails with probability (1 − sb) and, in that case, its 
liquidation value at (T2) is (βL). The value of (β < 1) captures the bankruptcy costs associated 
with delays and other frictions due to financial distress. Hence, with- 
5The term (e) captures the state of the economy or anything else which is beyond the firm’s control.  
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out additional information, at (T0), the expected net present value from a project is: ey + [(1 
− e)(sby + (1 − sb)βL)] − I. 
The bank or intermediary monitors the project closely and, as a result, can receive a 
“signal” at (T1) which conveys further information about its quality. The signal, which could 
take either high or low value, respectively represents a good or bad news about the project. If 
the news is bad, the decision is to discontinue the project immediately and the salvage value 
of the terminated project at (T1) is (L < I). 
We formulate the following assumptions: 
 
⎧  
⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪  
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩  
I > L, and (A) 
L > sby + (1 − sb)βL, or 
L[1 − (1 − sb)β] > sby (B) 
The assumption made in (A) above suggests that investment in the project is risky. The 
second assumption (B) indicates that additional information which conveys bad news is 
useful. The early detection of bad projects with a reliable and timely information saves costs 
for the firm. Hence, the current liquidation value exceeds the expected continuation value 
of the bad project. These two assumptions open up the possibility of gathering information 
and monitoring of the project by a financial intermediary6. Early detection helps in halting 
bad projects before it is too late7. 
The information structure used by the bank/intermediary is summarized by a system of 
signals which transmit further information about the quality of the project. If the true state 
of the world is w E {good, bad}, then signal σ E {high, low} consists of a probabilistic 
perception of the state described as follows: 
6We assume that these information gathering activities are specifically an expertise of the bank and not 
the firm. The banks, being informed lenders, acquire information about projects and monitor them both 
directly and via imposing covenants. See James 1987 and Lummer and McConnell 1989 for special role of 
banks followed by several works including Rajan and Winton 1995; Besanko and Thakor 1987; and Besanko 
and Kanatas 1993; for the information processing role of banks and intermediaries. 
7Liquidation may involve either sale or restructuring or even going to bankruptcy court (Chapter 7) for 
early liquidation. 
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Pr.(σ = h | ω = G) = 1 and Pr.(σ = ` | ω = G) = 0  
Pr.(σ = h | ω = B) = 1 − λ and Pr.(σ = ` | ω = B) = λ 
The structure of a signal is as such that the intermediary always receives high signal 
(which means that the news is good) when the actual state is good. However, the inter-
mediary receives low signal (meaning bad news) with a probability of (λ) when the state 
is bad. Thus, λ E (, 1) measures precision of the signal and the cost of acquiring the 
signal is (bλ2 
) where (b) is a constant. The higher the value of (λ), the greater is the value of 
the precision, signifying smaller error in perception of the actual state of the world. 
However, it is costlier to obtain a signal with greater precision. Thus banks choose an 
optimal precision of signal such that incremental gains and costs are equal. 
The intermediary thus provides the fund (I) needed to run the project at (T) and a 
manager runs it with the necessary input ( i.e. skill and labour). The intermediary collects 
information at (T), ensures the dissolution of the project when it receives low signal. 
The bank allows the project to continue whenever it receives high signal. We further 
assume that the intermediary/bank holds a partially secured debt contract, so that if the 
project continues and fails, it receives (βL) at (T). The pay-off is (L) at (T) if the project 
is discontinued. 
Hence, the expected pay-off (πb) of the bank at (T) is: 
 
max 
λ∈ 2 1 , 
πb = [e + (1 − e)(1 − λ)sb]Df 
+ (1 − e)[(1 − λ)(1 − sb)βL + λL] (1) 
2λ− I 
b 
The first term in the parenthesis captures the joint 
probability of a high signal received 
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− 
by the bank and the success of the project. The firm pays back the bank the face value of 
the loan Df. The second term captures two scenarios: One: the bank receives a high signal 
and the project continues but fails with the probability (1 − e)(1 − A)(1 − sb), it recovers a 
salvage of βL. Two: the bank receives a low signal when the project is bad, which occurs with 
probability (1 − e)A. The project is immediately liquidated at (T1) and the bank, being the 
senior and secured creditor, receives (L). 
The bank optimally chooses the precision of the signal, (A), to maximize its expected 
profit expressed in equation (1). The first order condition for the problem is: 
(1 − e)[L − sbDf − (1 − sb)βL] = Ab (2) 
The left hand side of (2) represents the marginal gains from acquiring more precise 
signals. The incremental benefit for acquiring such a signal of greater strength is the pay-off 
from early liquidation, as opposed to the expected pay-off sbDf − (1 − sb)βL in case of 
continuation of a bad project. The marginal cost of investing in better information 
technology is (Ab), captured by the right hand side of the same equation. We make the 
following additional observations: 
(i) If the left hand side (1 − e)[L − sbDf − (1 − sb)βL] is smaller than the right hand side 
(Ab) for all possible values of (A), then the minimum value of precision of the signal 
is (1 2 ≡ A0). If the inequality holds in the reverse, then the precision attains its 
maximum value of 1. 
(ii) The optimal precision of the signal acquired by the bank will depend on bankruptcy 
costs (β), the state of the economy (e) and the level of transparency in acquiring 
degrees of reliable information, captured by the cost (b). 
It is clear from equation (2) that the optimal acquisition of precision of signals will also 
depend on the face value of the loan, (Df), which is also an endogenous variable. 
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We add the zero expected profit condition for competitive banks and, together with the 
first-order condition in (2), they jointly determine the optimal value of the precision of 
signal and the face value of the loan. This is summarized by the proposition 1 below: 
Proposition 1 The optimal precision of signal and the face value of debt D* f are given 
] 
by: A* = (1 − e) [L_sbDf _(1_sb)βL and [e + (1 − e)sb]D* f + 
b 
2A
*2 = I − (1 − e)(1 − sb)βL. b 
Proposition 2 (a) The firm value 
π f  =[e+(1−e)sb]y+(1−e)(1−sb)βL− b 2A*2+A*(1 − e)[L − sby − (1 − sb)βL] 
And the incremental firm value due to acquisition of signal by banks is captured by the last 
two terms. - b 2A
*2 + A*(1 − e)[L − sby − (1 − sb)βL], which is the net incremental gain 
from information based restructuring L rather than continuing that yields a  value sby + (1 
− sb)βL 
3 Political Connections and Financial Markets 
This section incorporates political connections in the aforementioned framework to examine 
their impact on banks’ incentive to gather information and the consequences for the firm 
value. The firm spends resources to form political connections in anticipation of direct 
intervention from the Government in the event of project failure and firm bankruptcy. The 
resources spent take the form of employing either politically connected individuals who sit 
on the board or in various committees for advising and supervision of the project. In other 
words, the firm in our model buys services of politicians or politically connected individuals 
who could influence the probability of receiving bailout from the Government if the project 
fails. 
To be specific, a bailout occurs when the firm receives an amount (x) from the Gov-
ernment in the event of business failure. This happens when the banks receive high signal 
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but the selected project is of inferior quality and fails with a probability of (1 − sb)8. The 
probability of obtaining this bailout fund (x) under these circumstances depends on the fraction 
of politically connected members working in the firm. If the fraction (t) of such personnel is 
politically connected, then the probability of obtaining the government bailout fund is given by 
the function (f(t) = atγ). Where (a > 0) and (1 > 'y > 0) are constants and indicators of political 
strength, environment etc. Note that when (f(0) = 0) as done in the preceding section, it suggests 
that - without any political connection - the probability of receiving a bailout fund is zero 9. 
The political connection itself is a “risky asset” because, with the complementary 
probability (1 − atγ), the firm may not be able to obtain a bailout10. Secondly, adding an extra 
politically connected member to the firm’s management team helps because (f/(t) = a'ytγ−1 > 0). 
However, the incremental probability of obtaining bailout fund declines with addition of extra 
politically connected people to the firm as (f//(t) = a'y('y − 1)tγ−1 < 0). 
We must note that there are differential effects of political connections in dissimilar 
environment which can be captured by the term a For example, as mentioned in the 
introduction that empirical studies indicate that political intervention is more likely to 
occur in an economy dominated by the state owned banks (SOB) and we can capture the 
phenomenon with assumption as > ans, where subscripts s and ms stand for SOBs and 
non- SOBs. We must note that differential economic environments af fect returns to 
political connections as f/(a) = tγ > 0 
As before, the firm issues debt to finance the project and debt holders charge a face value 
of (Dp), which is repaid by the firm in the event of success of the project. If the 
8We omit the discussion of how the Government taxes other firms and costs  associated with such 
transfers. The issues are important but we want to focus on the incentives to acquire information and firm 
value.  
9The assumption is not crucial. We can add an exogenous probability of receiving the bail out fund and this will 
not change any results 
10We treat the effectiveness of political connections probabilistically, as is could be rendered ineffective 
by various factors such as negative media coverage or the government being voted out of power or connected 
BOD fails to perform according to expectation of the firm etc. See for example Cooper, Gulen and 
Ovtchinnikov 2010; and Goldman et al. 2009.  
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project fails and the political connection succeeds, then the firm receives an amount (x), 
in the form of Government bailout and this happens with the probability (atγ). In this case, 
the firm and its debt holders bargain for a share of the total pie (x + βL). We assume that 
the firm obtains (α) and the bank receives (1 − α) of the total pie11. The firm does not 
receive any bailout with a complementary probability of (1 − atγ) and the debt holders 
receive the salvage value (βL). This is in fact the amount they would receive when there 
is no such connections. 
The politically connected individuals in the firm receive (wp) and the rest (nonpolitically 
connected members) receive (wn). We assume that these remunerations are determined by 
the market for politically connected individuals. With this set-up, the firm’s expected pay-
off is: 
 
π f  
p  
= [e + (1 − e)(1 − λ)sb](y − Dp) 
+ (1 − e)(1 − λ)(1 − sb)[αatγ(βL + x)] (3)  
− wpt − wn(1 − t) 
 
To recapitulate, atγ = Political lobbying function; y = cash flow in the event of success; 
L = liquidation value of the project in the event of failure; e = Probability of arrival of a 
good project; Dp = face value of the loan; wp = remuneration of politically connected 
directors; wn = remunerations of the non-politically connected persons and I = investment 
for the project. The subscript “p” in a variable signifies its value in a politically connected 
firm in the rest of the paper. 
If the lenders charge a face value of Dp. their expected pay-off function is: 
11We omit the process of division of the total cash flow (βL + x) between the firm and its debtors and 
assume that (α) is exogenous. However, the model could be expanded in that direction without substantial 
changes in the result of the paper.  
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max 
A∈ (21,1) 
b 
π 
p 
= [e + (1 − e)(1 − λ)sb]Dp 
 
 
π b  
p  
= [e + (1 − e)(1 − λ)sb]Dp 
[ ] 
+ (1 − e) [λL + (1 − λ)(1 − sb){atγ(1 − α)(βL + x) + (1 − atγ)βL}] (4) 
b 
2λ2 − I 
The first terms collected within the square brackets are exactly the same 
as before and thus need no further explanations12. The last terms in equations (3) and (4) are 
new and need explanations. If the selected bad project continues upon the receipt of bank’s high 
signal, the probability of failure is (1− e)(1 − λ)(1 − sb), so that the firm or the bank files for 
bankruptcy, then either one of the following two mutually exclusive states occur: 
1. The political connection succeeds with probability (atγ), the firm and the bank 
respectively share (α) and (1 − α) of the total pie, (βL + x). 
2. The political connection fails with complementary probability and the bank receives (βL) 
but the firm receives nothing as the ’absolute priority rule (APR) kicks in. 
Finally, if the bank receives low signal when the project is bad, it receives the full liquidation 
value of the project, (L)13. The Bank chooses (λ) to maximize expected pay-off. Hence, 
 
 
[ ] 
+ (1 − e) λL + (1 − λ)(1 − sb){atγ(1 − α)(βL + x) + (1 − atγ)βL (5) 
− b2λ2 − I 
12This is due to our assumption that political connections are redundant in the event of success or of liquidation 
of the project based on early information. 
13Note when the project continues and fails in the next time period, the bank receives βL., However, if the project 
continues and fails, an immediate liquidation generates (L > βL) for the bank. 
− 
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Equation (5) captures the link between political connection of the firms and their 
financiers” expected payoffs. For example, the greater the strength of the political con-
nection (measured by a), or the greater the fraction of politically connected individu-
als/directors (measured by t), the more secured is the debt, as the bank recovers a higher 
fraction of the debt even if the firm is bankrupt. Therefore, political connections of firms 
directly impact the bank’s optimal choice of the degree of precision of signals. This is 
reflected in the first order condition below: 
(1 − e)[L − sbDp − (1 − sb){βL + atγx(1 − α) − atγαβL}] = λpb (2A) 
Comparing the above equation (2A) with (2) in page 11 (benchmark model), we observe 
that the political influence (atγ) affects optimal acquisition of information, as it enters 
directly in the first-order condition. It also reduces optimal precision of signal if the bank’s 
incremental gains from a firm’s political connections is positive. Proposition 3 below 
summarizes this effect on the optimal precision of the signal acquired by banks.  
Proposition 3 The political connection of firms will reduce the optimal degree of precision of 
the signal compared to its absence if (1 − α)x > αβL , that is, creditors’ pay-off from the political 
bailout exceeds the same with its absence. 
A direct comparison between equations (2A) and (2) establish the results in Proposition 
3. If the firm does not employ any politically connected individuals (t = 0), the first-order 
condition above coincides with the same in (2). We assume the inequality (1 − α)x > αβL 
holds in the rest of the analysis. The condition states that bank’s share of the bail out fund 
exceeds the amount it loses out to the firm’s shareholders from the salvage value of the 
project (αβL)14. 
We can conclude that (i) political connection of firms leads to a fall in the precision of 
information acquired by banks and (ii) the loss of incremental precision of the signal is 
14The assumption is that banks participate in the bailout programme to share the pie, otherwise as senior 
creditors, they might veto against such activities. 
16 
maximum for (t = 1). The intuitive reason is that “political connections” of firms act as an 
“intangible collateral” and tend to make debt more secured in the case of bankruptcy. Hence 
the probability that the bank may lose the incentive to gather valuable information about 
downside risk, captured by a decline in (A) and (iii) the degree and the magnitude of 
information loss will be higher in economies dominated by the SOBs where (as discussed 
before) it is more likely that the inequality as > ans might hold true. Finally, it is evident from 
(2A) that optimal precision of the signal (Ap) acquired by the bank also directly depends on 
the degree of political connections of the firm (t). Next we turn to the analysis of the firm’s 
trade-off that determines the degree of political connections. 
3.1 Firm’s Political Connections:  
When a firm chooses the optimal level of political connection, (t) it takes 
(i) the degree of information precision acquired by the bank (Ap) to be given. 
(ii) (Dp) to be such that the bank makes a break-even. Thus, firm’s expected pay-off 
is: 
 
π f  
p  = [e+(1−e)(1−A)sb](y−Dp) (6) 
+ (1 − e)(1 − A)(1 − sb)[αatγ(x + βL] − wpt − wn(1 − t)  
By inserting (Dp) from the zero expected profit of the bank (i.e. setting the equation (4) 
equal to zero), into equation (6) above, we obtain the expected profit of the firm (7) and the 
firm now chooses (t) to maximize the expected pay-off:15 
15It can be noted that the model and the firm’s expected pay-off (given in equation (7)) concides with the 
benchmark model of the section 2 without political connection with t = 0, i.e., when the firm does not have 
a politically cnnected member in either BUD or in payroll. 
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 e λ sγax
Hence, t  = 
w w
1   
1 −
  and the probability of receiving bail out via 
 
= [e + (1 − e)(1 − λ)sb]y 
+ (1 − e)[λL + (1 − λ)(1 − sb)fatγx + βL1] (7) 
− wpt − wn(1 − t) 
and the first-order condition is: 
t : (1 − e)(1 − λ)(1 − sb)aγtγ x − (wp − wn) = 0 (8) 
Equation (8) apparently captures the similarity between “hedging” and political con-
nections. If the firm becomes financially distressed, which occurs with probability (1 − e)(1 
− λ)(1 − sb) replacing a non-politically connected person with someone connected increases 
the probability of bailout (of receiving x) by aγtγ x. However it incurs an extra cost of 
(wp−wn) for buying “political patronage” . At the optimum both should be equal. 
 

) 1− 
politically connected board member is: at γ e λ sγax =   __. 
w w
For simplicity, we will be working with γ = for the clarity of the exposition, in which 

n  a t case, t  =  = a 
 e λ sb14 e λ sa
w w w w
Proposition 4 (i) The incremental firm value attributed to polit ical connection for the 
case γ= is 

(1 − e)(1( — λ)(1 − 
sb)ax)− 
wp 
 wn) 
 
π f  
p  
max 
 t  
18 
(1 − e)(1 − λ)(1 − sb)at γx − t (wp − wn) = 
(ii) The firm tends to employ a greater fraction of politically connected individuals in  
response to a larger bailout fund and the fraction tends to increase with the strength of the 
political connection (a), but decreases with a relative rise in the compensations of the politically 
connected individuals vis-a-vis non connected members (wp − wn). 
4 Equilibrium: The value of the Firm and Political 
Connections 
The Proposition 4, above shows that the firm’s optimal political connectivity t*, depends on 
bank’s acquisition of informtion given by the precision of the signal (Ap). Similarly, 
proposition 3 shows the optimal precision of the signal acquired by the bank also explicitly 
depends on the firm’s political connections atγ. Intuitively, an increased strength of political 
connections of the firm will reduce the optimal precision of banks’ signal because the loan 
is now more secured due to the possibility of a bailout. In a similar way, a lower precision 
of bank’s signal, as the proposition 4 shows will increase the firm’s optimal level of political 
ties. A lower precision of the signal will make banks mistake the low quality project for a 
high quality one more frequently. The firm will thus experience more project failures and 
bankruptcies which make the political connections more profitable. The upshot of the 
propositions 3 and 4 is that the optimal selection of precision of the bank’s signal and the 
optimal political connections of the firm are interdependent and thus they are determined in 
Nash equilibrium. 
Proposition 5 below resolves the interdependence between A* p, D* p, t*. Proposition 6 
expresses the equilibrium value of the firm as a function of banks information precision and 
firms degree of political connection. 
Proposition 5 The tuple {A* p, D* p, t*} get determined by (i) the bank’s zero expected profit 
condition, (ii) optimal degree of precision of signal acquired by the bank, and (iii) firm’s optimum 
level of political connections. The conditions are fulfilled by the following sets of 
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equations. 
[e + (1  e)sb]Dp + 2λ∗ 2 
b p + (1  e)(1  sb)[βL + (1  λ∗  p)Z]  I = 0 
(1  e)[L  sbDp  (1  sb)βL + (1  λ∗  p)Z]  λ∗  pb = 0 
 
((1  e)(1  λ)(1  sb)ax ! 
2  
(wp  wn) 
2 
! 2  
((1−e)(1−sb) 2 1 (ax) 
Where Z = x(1  α)  αβL x  is a positive number given the param- 
(wp−wn) 
e t e r s .  
Proposition 6 The corresponding equilibrium firm value π f  pis: 
[e + (1  e)sb]y + (1  e)(1  sb)βL 
[ ] 
 bλ∗ 2
p  
+ (1  e)λ∗  L  sby  (1  sb)βL 
 p 2 
[ 
1 ___ 
+ (1  λ∗  b)2 (1  e)(1  sb)ax]2 
2(wp  wn) 
5 Discussions and Empirical Implications 
Propositions 5 and 6 outline the optimal determination of political connections of the firm 
and the degree of information acquisition of banks, as well as their combined impact on 
equilibrium firm value. Proposition 5 shows that optimal precision of bank’s signal, face value 
of its loan and political connections of the firm are determined simultaneously. We formulate 
these relationships as functions of deep parameters such as costs of information 
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a n d  
t ∗  =  
acquisition (b), the strength of political connections (a) and the state of the economy (1 e). 
That is, a country’s corporate governance laws on information disclosures, political 
atmosphere (e.g., predominance of SOBs) and the state of overall economic condition 
decisively determine i) the extent of firm’s political connections, ii) banks’ pay-off, iii) 
supervision and monitoring technology. iv) and finally, their collective impact on the firm 
value. For example, opaque laws of disclosures for firms or a non-transparent accounting 
system in a country will raise the banks’ cost of acquisition of information (b) about the 
state of firm’s projects. This will result in a lower value of A∗  p (can be observed from the 
equation (2A)) As a consequence, it is more likely that bad projects will continue and not 
be liquidated. 
The increased likelihood of an unfavorable scenario (stemming from a higher cost of 
information acquisition (b)) thus makes the expected pay-off from incremental political 
connections greater from the firm’s point of view, which can be directly inferred from expression 
for t∗ . Thus, the trade-off between information-based monitoring of the project (i.e. acquiring a 
better signal) and political connection will tilt in the favour of the latter in a country with weak 
disclosure laws and lack of transparencies. 
Similarly, an increased premium paid to the politically connected agents, measured by 
a larger magnitude (wp − wn) (in economies where the connected individuals are scarce), 
would make the incremental costs of political connections larger and will prompt the firm 
to spend less resources in building up such links. This, in turn, will lower the probability of 
obtaining bailout funds and result in a lower pay-off in bankruptcy for both firms and the 
banks and would make loans less collateralized and secure. This will encourage banks to 
invest further resources to obtain more precise signal resulting in a higher (A∗  p). Thus, a 
higher premium paid to politically connected persons moves the trade-off more towards 
information-based bank supervision and monitoring. 
We presented substantial empirical evidence that political connections tend to be more 
frequent in economies dominated by the SOBs. In the parlance of our framework, this will 
translate into a higher value of (a) which implies that the connection tends to be stronger for a 
given composition of BOD (t) for such economies. It can be directly seen from the 
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equation (8) that the marginal value of political connections will be larger, leading to a higher 
composition of politically connected BOD/personnel and will result in a greater value of 
t∗  and at∗  2 1 .. This will result in lower precision of signal acquired by the bank as can be 
seen from equation (2A). Hence, state intervention in the banking system will move the 
trade-off towards more political connections and lesser quality of banking services. 
The extent of political connections and information-based monitoring in equilibrium 
also depends on the state of the economy captured by the term (1 − e). If the state of the 
economy is poor, it implies that the probability of arrival of a poorer quality project is higher. 
Accordingly, a better and precise information has a greater incremental value for the bank 
which will further invest to acquire error-proof technology for monitoring firms. However, 
the impact on the firm’s investment in political connection in anticipation of a poor state of 
the economy tends to be ambiguous. The likelihood of worse prospects for the economy 
increases the incremental value of hedging via political connections. On the other hand, the 
bank’s increased bid to acquire a more precise signal leads to the greater possibility of 
liquidation of projects, which in turn discourages the firm to investing in building up political 
connections. The equilibrium political connections, in this case, will depend on the relative 
strength of the two opposing effects. 
The empirical predictions made so far from the equilibrium analysis of the model can be 
directly interpreted and analyzed by putting Propositions 5 and 6 together. The propositions 
succinctly capture the inverse relation between the degree of political connections of firms 
and information-based supervision by banks, which is the central theme of the paper. The 
proposition 6 breaks down firm value into three components: (i) The first term in the 
expression are NPV of the project (ii) the second term L − sby − (1 − sb)βL − bλ∗ 2 
p  
2 
is the bank’s incremental net contribution to firm value from supervision and monitoring 
technology through a better information precision. 
The last term captures the firm value attributed to political connections. The expres- 
22 
sion in proposition 6 highlights two important features which convey the essence of the 
paper: First, it can seen that while the magnitude from bank’s contributions to the firm’s 
NPV are multiplied by A* p, the same component from political contribution is weighed by 
(1 − A*p)2. Since the proposition 3 establishes that A p < A*, we conclude that the political 
sources form greater part of the value of the connected firms and bank’s contribution to 
incremental firm value declines as a consequence. This signifies the trade-off between 
quality of banks’ services and political intervention in financial markets as the former 
displaces information based bank lending. Second, a marginal decline in the strength of 
signal magnifies the impact on the effectiveness of political connectivity implying that trade-
off is much more pronounced at a lower level of bank’s information-based lending activities. 
Thus, combining proposition 5 and 6 together, we find that the incremental firm value places 
weight of (A* p) to information-based supervision. However, it places a greater weight (1 − A*p)2 
on political connections. Where, A p depends on fundamentals such as costs of acquisitions of 
information b, state’s ownership role in banking, costs of political connections (wp − wn), and 
the state of the economy, (1 − e). Based on the discussion of the implications of these two 
propositions, we can summarize our empirical predictions in the form of following 
hypotheses:16: 
1. The larger the costs of acquiring information, b (resulting from weak disclosure laws), 
the lower the precision of signal. The bank’s signal is less informative and the firm will 
tend to have a higher degree of political connection. 
2. The greater the state invention in the overall financial system, the larger the strength of 
the political connections, the lower the precision of the bank’s signal. This hypothesis 
captures the hidden costs of strength of political ties likely to be observed in economies 
with state ownership of banks. 
16In the appendix B, we prove hypothesis 1. We omit the proof of the other hypotheses in the text as they are 
the replicate one another. However, proof can be obtained upon the request from the author.  
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3. The tighter the economic condition, the higher the quality of bank monitoring on firms. 
The impact on the political connections of firms is ambiguous. 
4. The lower the premium paid to the connected individuals, the larger the political 
connections and the smaller is the value of banks’ signal, signifying the greater 
contribution of the former towards the firm value. 
6 Conclusion 
Political connections are almost ubiquitous. However, their origins and the causes of their 
appearance vary across economies and countries, depending on the a country’s economic, 
political and legal settings. We have shown that hedging and enhancing the collateral value 
of its loan motivate the firm to form political connections. It also comes at a cost in the 
form of slackening banks’ information-based oversight of firms’ projects. We demonstrated 
that such a trade-off would vary across different economic states, political and legal 
circumstances and have advanced hypotheses for testing the differential impacts on the 
emergence of political connections in financial markets and their effects on firm value. As 
a policy implication, the paper issues an advisory warning against bank nationalization 
which is quite popular in many emerging markets as means to enhance social welfare and 
banking stability. A major conclusion obtained in the paper is that such decisions often 
impose hidden costs on the economy which impair banks’ core functions of information 
acquisition and may outweigh any possible gains. 
The model is simple yet general and straightforward enough to extend our results to the 
most interesting cases such as the relationship between political connections and firm’s 
incentive to boost effort or private gains of its owners. It would also be interesting to examine 
the role of competition among firms impact in formation of political connections. In our 
future research, we plan to address these problems and issues in greater detail. 
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APPENDIX A 
Proof. (Proposition 1) The equilibrium must satisfy the bank’s expected zero profit  
condition is 
[e + (1 − e)(1 − λ*)sb]Df 
+ (1 − e)[λ*L + (1 − λ*)(1 − sb)βL 
− 2λ*2 − I = 0 b 
(A.1) 
 
and the bank’s optimality conditions for the choice of λ: 
(1 − e)[L − SbDf − (1 − sb)βL] = λ*b (A.2) 
Rewriting equation (A.1), we get: 
[e + (1 − e)]Df 
+ (1 − e)λ*[L − sbDf − (1 − sb)βL] 
+ (1−e)(1−sb)βL− 2λ*2 − I = 0 
b 
Using (A.2) in the above expression, we get: 
[e + (1 − e)]Df + 2λ*2 − I − (1 − e)(1 − sb)βL = 0 
b (A.3) 
Proof. (Proposition 2) By inserting the value of Df from above equation into, firm’s 
expected profit yields: πf = [e+(1−e)sb]y+(1−e)(1−sb)βL+ b 2λ*2 −λ*sb(1−e)(y −D* f) 
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Proof. (Proposition 3) The firm’s expected profit is: 
= [e + (1 − e)sb](y − Dp) 
+ (1 − e)(1 − λ)(1 − sb)atγα{βL + x} 
− wpt − wn(1 − t) 
The expected profit of the bank is: 
 
π b  
p  
= [e + (1 − e)(1 − λ)sb]Dp 
+ (1 − e)[λL + (1 − λ)(1 − sb){x(1 − α)atγ − αβLatγ}] 
b 
2λ2 − I 
Setting the expected profit of the competitive banks equal to zero 
and plugging the resultant value of Dp into (A.4), we get the firm’s expected pay-off as: 
π f  
p  
= [e + (1 − e)(1 − λ)sb]y − 2λ2 
b 
+ (1 − e)[λL + {(1 − λ)(1 − sb)(βL + atγx)}] − twp − (1 − t)wn 
(A.6) 
 
Maximizing (A.6) with respect to t yields: 
 
t* = (1 − e)(1 − λ)(1 − sb)γax) 
(wp − wn) 
1   
1 − γ  
 
Using γ = 21 in the above expression, we get the expression for t* in the proposition, 
2 
(1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb)a2 a (1−e)(1−λ)(1−sb)a2 t* = and ate = 
(wp−wn) 1 (wp−wn) 
Proof. (Proposition 5) Equilibrium: Equilibrium in the model consists of a tuple {D*p, 
λ*p, t*} such that (i) the firm’s expected pay-off is at a maximum, (ii) the bank has obtained 
an optimal degree of precision of precision of signal, (iii) the competitive banks 
π f  
p  
(A.4)  
(A.5)  
− 
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earn zero profit in expectations. As shown in the body of the paper, that for a given level of 
(Dp) and (t), the banks choose the optimal degree of precision of signal (λ*p) to maximize 
their expected pay-off in (A.5) and the corresponding first-order condition rewritten here 
below: 
(1 − e)[L − sbDp − (1 − sb){βL + (1 − λ*p)Z}] − λ*pb = 0 (A.7)  
and from proposition 3 t* = −e−λ−sba 
wp−wn )
Next, rewriting (A.5) as 
π b  
p = [e + (1 − e)sb]Dp  
+ (1 − e)λ[L − sbDp − (1 − sb){βL + atγx(1 − α) − αatγβL}] 
b 
+ (1 − e)(1 − sb){βL + atγx(1 − α) − αatγβL} − 2λ − I 
and then by using the λ*p from (A.7), we have 
[e + (1 − e)sb]Dp + 2λ; 
+ (1 − e)(1 − sb)[βL + atγ{x(1 − α) − αβL}] − I = 0 
Finally using γ = and the expression at __  from proposition 3, we obtain: 
[e + (1 − e)sb]Dp + 2λ* 
b p + (1 − e)(1 − sb[βL + (1 − λ*p)Z − I = 0 (A.8) 
Where Z = {x(1 − α) − αβLx } −e−wj  ax) 
Similarly, (A.7) can be written after using proposition (3) as:  
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(1 − e)L − (1 − e)sbDp − (1 − e)(1 − sb)βL + (1 − λ*p)Z − λ*pb = 0 (A.9) 
and from proposition 3 
t* = (1 − e)(1 − λp*)(1 − sb) 2 
(A.10) 
(wp − wn) 
The tuple D*p, λ*p, t* is determined by the solution to 
system of equations given in (A.8) 
(1−e)(1−sb)2 1 (ax) 
- (A.10). Where Z = x{(1 − α) − αβL x }  (wp−wn) 
AP P E N D I X  B  
The tuple D*p, λ*p, t* is determined by the solution to system of equations given in (A.8)-(A.10) 
in proposition 5 of Appendix A. By implicitly differentiating these equations with respect to 
firm value with respect to b, we find: 
dλ* 
−(1 − e)sbdD dbp− [b − Z]  dbp = λp* 
dD p  dλ ;  λ ; 2  
e + (1 − e)sbdb ± λ*pb − Zdb =  2
Solving implicitly these two equations, we get: 
λ'i,e + (1 − e)sb 1 − λ 
= ____________________ < 0 (B.1) 
Δ 
 
dDp 
db 
λ∗ 2λ∗  
bp+1 −2p Zλ; 
= _________________ > 0 (B.2) 
Δ 
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 2 
λ* p 
db 
Where 
Δ = (Z  b)[e + (1  e)sb] + (bλ*p Z)(1  e)sb (B.3) 
=  b(1  e)sb(1  λ*p) + e[Z  b] < 0 
and 
Z n[(1 e)(1  sb) 21 (ax)1 
 fx(1 a) a
(wp wn) 2 (B.4) 
Impact on the incremental firm value: The equilibrium incremental firm value as given 
in Proposition 6 is rewritten below. 
 
π f  
p  
= [e + (1  e)sb]y + (1  e)(1  sb)βL 
+ (1  e)λ;[L  sby  (1  sb)βL ] bλF (B.5) 
+ (1  λ*b)2 2(wp 1  wn) [(1  e)(1  sb)ax]2 
 
The impact of a change in the costs of acquiring a more precise signal is given by the 
following expression. 
(B.6) 
1 dλ*p  
i db 
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1  λ* 
= [L  spy  (1  sb)βL  λ*p p  (1  e)(1  sb)ax2 
wp wn 
d π f  
p  
db  
The first term inside the bracket, L  spy + (1  sb)βLis the incremental gain from 
added information and is positive from the condition (A) in the first section of the paper. 
The second term is the incremental gains from political connection ( as shown 
λ∗dbin the proposition 6). Since ddbp < 0, the sign of  d /b) will depend on whether “political  
connections” effect dominates the “information gathering” effects of banks. 
The other hypothesis can be proved with the similar methods and reasoning. For 
example, the hypothesis 2 which highlights the possible political impact of the state 
ownership on the precision of bank’s signal. Following the same method, it can be shown 
dZ  
that dλ∗  p da e 
da  =  Δ < 0.  
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